Wednesday, August 31, 2005
Essays on Free Will: Introduction
Over the next few weeks, I will be posting a series of essays on the concept of free will. This is a topic that fascinates me, primarily because belief in the existence of human free will is so widely held and yet so obviously inconsistent with other fundamental philosophical, scientific, religious and legal concepts. That the vast majority of human beings cling to a notion that flatly contradicts one or more of their other beliefs is, at the very least, a curious fact that merits reflection.
In my view, the concept of free will is a cognitive short-cut that aided the complex social animal that is the human being pass through the gantlet of natural selection, and thus lingers in our species today. Such cognitive short-cuts, while aiding animals whose survival depends on quick, simple and statistically beneficial guidelines for decision-making, often obscure the true nature of reality. And so it is with free will: we believe in free will, because it is an efficient and generally useful model of human behavior; however, the theory that humans are capable of decision-making free of external influences and of altering the course of the future is almost certainly not an accurate reflection of reality. This central idea will be expanded upon in the subsequent essays, which are listed below along with short descriptions of what I will (or, rather, intend) to detail in each one.
1. The Definition of “Free Will”
Before embarking on an investigation of the existence of free will, it must first be established exactly what we mean by “free will.” In this essay, I will evaluate several considerations and formulate a reasonable working definition of free will that provides a basis for further analysis.
2. Is Free Will Required to Explain Empirical Data?
One key argument in favor of the existence of free will is its power to explain human decision-making. In this essay, I evaluate whether the concept of free will is a necessary component of theoretical models of human behavior. Emphasis is placed on the scientific notion of the relative “truth” of one theory in comparison to others; on this metric, the truth of a theory is established by demonstrating that it is Pareto optimal on the parameter of predictive accuracy when compared to other competing theories. Additionally, the preference for theoretical simplicity is discussed. The notion of free will can be shown to be theoretically superfluous and only equally accurate, at best, when compared to other theories.
3. Free Will and Causality
The notion of causality is one of the central assumptions underlying human understanding of nature: for every occurrence, we ascribe a cause. The concept of free will is shown to be only partially consistent with the notions of causality, and entirely incompatible with unique causality, also known as determinism. Free will is shown to be impossible not only in a strictly deterministic world, but in a strictly non-deterministic world as well. The causal system in which free will is possible is constructed and analyzed.
4. Free Will and Omniscience
It is important to understand the relation of free will and omniscience because the two concepts are often preached in tandem within religious systems. This essay presents a simple proof that free will and omniscience cannot coexist. A broader theory, which proposes that free will cannot exist in a determined system (a class which includes deterministic worlds and worlds in which omniscience is possible), is discussed.
5. Free Will and Legal Culpability
Religion is not the only realm in which we find notions of free will. The concept that man can freely choose his actions also plays a central role in the law. In fact, it might be argued that law is the primary realm of free will, as religious doctrine surrounding free will is almost always centered on sacred law. This essay will discuss the utility of the free will concept to legal systems, and analyze several problems that arise from misguided focus on free will in evaluating culpability.
6. Why Do We Believe in Free Will?
With the concept of free will relegated to theoretical trash heap, one final question remains: if free will is so obviously a fantasy, why do humans so strongly believe in its existence? This essay provides some answers to that question.
Of course, I reserve the right to adjust this outline as the essays are developed. Enjoy!
In my view, the concept of free will is a cognitive short-cut that aided the complex social animal that is the human being pass through the gantlet of natural selection, and thus lingers in our species today. Such cognitive short-cuts, while aiding animals whose survival depends on quick, simple and statistically beneficial guidelines for decision-making, often obscure the true nature of reality. And so it is with free will: we believe in free will, because it is an efficient and generally useful model of human behavior; however, the theory that humans are capable of decision-making free of external influences and of altering the course of the future is almost certainly not an accurate reflection of reality. This central idea will be expanded upon in the subsequent essays, which are listed below along with short descriptions of what I will (or, rather, intend) to detail in each one.
1. The Definition of “Free Will”
Before embarking on an investigation of the existence of free will, it must first be established exactly what we mean by “free will.” In this essay, I will evaluate several considerations and formulate a reasonable working definition of free will that provides a basis for further analysis.
2. Is Free Will Required to Explain Empirical Data?
One key argument in favor of the existence of free will is its power to explain human decision-making. In this essay, I evaluate whether the concept of free will is a necessary component of theoretical models of human behavior. Emphasis is placed on the scientific notion of the relative “truth” of one theory in comparison to others; on this metric, the truth of a theory is established by demonstrating that it is Pareto optimal on the parameter of predictive accuracy when compared to other competing theories. Additionally, the preference for theoretical simplicity is discussed. The notion of free will can be shown to be theoretically superfluous and only equally accurate, at best, when compared to other theories.
3. Free Will and Causality
The notion of causality is one of the central assumptions underlying human understanding of nature: for every occurrence, we ascribe a cause. The concept of free will is shown to be only partially consistent with the notions of causality, and entirely incompatible with unique causality, also known as determinism. Free will is shown to be impossible not only in a strictly deterministic world, but in a strictly non-deterministic world as well. The causal system in which free will is possible is constructed and analyzed.
4. Free Will and Omniscience
It is important to understand the relation of free will and omniscience because the two concepts are often preached in tandem within religious systems. This essay presents a simple proof that free will and omniscience cannot coexist. A broader theory, which proposes that free will cannot exist in a determined system (a class which includes deterministic worlds and worlds in which omniscience is possible), is discussed.
5. Free Will and Legal Culpability
Religion is not the only realm in which we find notions of free will. The concept that man can freely choose his actions also plays a central role in the law. In fact, it might be argued that law is the primary realm of free will, as religious doctrine surrounding free will is almost always centered on sacred law. This essay will discuss the utility of the free will concept to legal systems, and analyze several problems that arise from misguided focus on free will in evaluating culpability.
6. Why Do We Believe in Free Will?
With the concept of free will relegated to theoretical trash heap, one final question remains: if free will is so obviously a fantasy, why do humans so strongly believe in its existence? This essay provides some answers to that question.
Of course, I reserve the right to adjust this outline as the essays are developed. Enjoy!
Friday, August 19, 2005
BrickBaby
Okay, I'll admit it. I've been a lazy sack of shit since last December. Today's posts are the first new additions to this blog since Anthony Flew made his mental illness public. But, I've been busy. I've been REALLY busy. Since last December, I have accomplished the following tasks: (1) I finished my Fall semester finals, (2) I started and completed a Winter semester, (3) I started and finished a Spring semester, (4) the wife and I tripped to Playa del Carmen, Mexico, (5) I knocked up the wife and (6) I started and finished my summer associate jobs with a couple of law firms in Austin, Texas. Yes, humble reader, you read that list correctly... I had to take classes in the winter.
Also, of lesser interest, is the news that BrickWife and I are expecting our first child, which will be named "Hellspawn" - if not by us, then certainly by the poor souls unfortunate enough to live under our child's iron-fisted reign of terror. Yes, I fully expect my firstborn to rise to power in a violent revolution, only to brutally oppress his subjects and establish an empire of the cruelest and most bloodthirsty temperment. Ah... what idealistic hopes we new fathers hold for our future children! Anyhoo, below is an image from BrickBaby's first sonogram.
Aside from the impending birth of our little eating-and-pooping machine, I have very little news to report. I plan to start posting, in serial, my thoughts on the concept of free will. Deja vu? Yes, I've made such promises before, only to deliver JACK SQUAT. However, I'm staring 2 weeks of freetime in the face and am already bored of doing my wife's laundry. Do you know how awkward it is to walk into the public laundry room with a basket full of nothing but frilly panties? Well, it's even more uncomfortable when I have to wash my wife's clothes!
Since I've already put together an outline of my free will diatribe, I figure, what the hell?, I might as well choose to spend my free time explaining why I believe we are incapable of truly choosing what we can do. I hope that after several months of seclusion in my own little personal bubble of non-bloggery, I still have some readers out there. If not, well fuck it - I'll just have to amuse myself with what amounts to partnerless rhetorical masturbation. Enjoy!
Also, of lesser interest, is the news that BrickWife and I are expecting our first child, which will be named "Hellspawn" - if not by us, then certainly by the poor souls unfortunate enough to live under our child's iron-fisted reign of terror. Yes, I fully expect my firstborn to rise to power in a violent revolution, only to brutally oppress his subjects and establish an empire of the cruelest and most bloodthirsty temperment. Ah... what idealistic hopes we new fathers hold for our future children! Anyhoo, below is an image from BrickBaby's first sonogram.
Aside from the impending birth of our little eating-and-pooping machine, I have very little news to report. I plan to start posting, in serial, my thoughts on the concept of free will. Deja vu? Yes, I've made such promises before, only to deliver JACK SQUAT. However, I'm staring 2 weeks of freetime in the face and am already bored of doing my wife's laundry. Do you know how awkward it is to walk into the public laundry room with a basket full of nothing but frilly panties? Well, it's even more uncomfortable when I have to wash my wife's clothes!
Since I've already put together an outline of my free will diatribe, I figure, what the hell?, I might as well choose to spend my free time explaining why I believe we are incapable of truly choosing what we can do. I hope that after several months of seclusion in my own little personal bubble of non-bloggery, I still have some readers out there. If not, well fuck it - I'll just have to amuse myself with what amounts to partnerless rhetorical masturbation. Enjoy!
The Case for Christ
I recently picked up a copy of Lee Strobel's much-heralded defense of the historical (and spiritual) Jesus Christ, The Case for Christ. After reading approximately 50% of the work, I am convinced that a better title would have been The Case for Christian Credulity.
For those who are unfamiliar with Strobel's work, here is a brief summary. Lee Strobel is a graduate of Yale Law School (he earned something called a "Masters of Studies in Law," which indicates that he completed what roughly amounts to the first 1/3rd of a JD program) who formerly served as a legal editor of the Chicago Tribune. His pedigree is unforgettable, if only because, throughout the book, Mr. Strobel constantly reminds the reader of his credentials. In any case, the book basically presents a litigation-style case for the historical reality of the Jesus of the Bible. Strobel seeks out and questions various experts, whose fields of study include theology, history, liguistics, archaeology, psychology, etc. Although Mr. Strobel would like his readers to believe that his role is akin to that of an impartial judge or jury member, it is more analagous to that of an attorney interviewing potential expert witnesses. Strobel chooses only experts who agree with his final conclusion; this is true even when he seeks to evaluate the merits of work that contradicts his views. What's more, the author's selection of experts includes only men who are devout Christians. In short, Strobel is looking for reassurance from scholars who he knows will vigorously uphold his final, predetermined conclusion. His quest is to construct one-sided advocacy, not find the truth.
All the while, Strobel nods approvingly to even the most plainly absurd of explanations. One example, which I will share below, was the inspiration for creating this thread. When reading TCFC last night, I came across this doozey and about fell out of my chair from laughing so hard. So, without further ado, I present my Case for the Credulity of Lee Strobel.
In his chapter dealing with the work of the infamous Jesus Seminar, which Strobel labels the "rebuttal evidence," the author interviews "Ivy League-educated theology professor" and pastor of the Woodland Hills Church, Gregory Boyd. See Strobel at p. 112. While the entire interview is full of logical fallacies, my favorite occurred during Strobel and Boyd's discussion of the non-canonical Cross Gospel. When queried as to the credibility of the Cross Gospel, Boyd responded:
"No, most scholars don't give it credibility, because it includes such outlandishly legendary material. For instance, Jesus comes out of his tomb and he's huge - he goes up beyond the sky - and the cross comes out of the tomb and actually talks! Obviously, the much more sober gospels are more reliable than anything found in this account."
Strobel at p. 123.
Strobel never questions this assessment. He moves on to another gospel, presumably satisfied with a theory that distinguishes the genuine accounts of Jesus Christ from the frauds on the basis of the "outlandishly legendary" nature of the material. Strobel is comfortable with the idea that a giant Jesus and a talking cross are too obviously mythical to be believed. However, he completely ignores the necessary consequence of such a test: the canonical gospels, along with pretty much the entire Old Testament, Acts and most of the New Testament epistles, must fail this same test of legitimacy. Talking crosses are too outlandish to be believed? You'll get no argument from me, but don't try to sell me on the idea of having a conversation with inflamed shrubbery. A giant Jesus is absurd? Fair enough. But, so also is a giant Philistine, or a Jesus who walks on water, or a Jesus who flies into Heaven.
Boyd's major basis for distinguishing between one set of gospels and all of the rest is simply laughable, and yet Yale Law School partial-graduate Lee Strobel (did I mention that he has years of experience as a legal reporter and is Ivy League-educated?) failed to pick up on such an obvious flaw.
While the scene above is clearly one example of an error of logic in TCFC, it is important to note that it is representative of an epidemic of fallacy in Strobel's work. Throughout the book, Strobel employs specious reasoning and demonstrates an inability to recognized or challenge obvious flaws in the rationale of his supposed experts. Strobel introduces each of his chosen experts with an embarrassing appeal to authority; their education, publications, and even their stereotypically intelligent appearance are described in excrutiating detail as if such superficial nonsense will lend credence to the snippets of opinion that follow. Each interview is a series of softball questions followed by hollow answers lacking detail followed by either a softball follow-up or a gullible affirmation by the author. The expert "testimony" is generally lacking in substance and very, very few citations are made. We are supposed to believe the expert's typically summary conclusions for no other reason besides their impressive resumes and nerdy personas.
I will continue to read the book, if only because it is an incredibly easy read and a fertile source of ammunition with which to critique fundamentalist "logic."
For those who are unfamiliar with Strobel's work, here is a brief summary. Lee Strobel is a graduate of Yale Law School (he earned something called a "Masters of Studies in Law," which indicates that he completed what roughly amounts to the first 1/3rd of a JD program) who formerly served as a legal editor of the Chicago Tribune. His pedigree is unforgettable, if only because, throughout the book, Mr. Strobel constantly reminds the reader of his credentials. In any case, the book basically presents a litigation-style case for the historical reality of the Jesus of the Bible. Strobel seeks out and questions various experts, whose fields of study include theology, history, liguistics, archaeology, psychology, etc. Although Mr. Strobel would like his readers to believe that his role is akin to that of an impartial judge or jury member, it is more analagous to that of an attorney interviewing potential expert witnesses. Strobel chooses only experts who agree with his final conclusion; this is true even when he seeks to evaluate the merits of work that contradicts his views. What's more, the author's selection of experts includes only men who are devout Christians. In short, Strobel is looking for reassurance from scholars who he knows will vigorously uphold his final, predetermined conclusion. His quest is to construct one-sided advocacy, not find the truth.
All the while, Strobel nods approvingly to even the most plainly absurd of explanations. One example, which I will share below, was the inspiration for creating this thread. When reading TCFC last night, I came across this doozey and about fell out of my chair from laughing so hard. So, without further ado, I present my Case for the Credulity of Lee Strobel.
In his chapter dealing with the work of the infamous Jesus Seminar, which Strobel labels the "rebuttal evidence," the author interviews "Ivy League-educated theology professor" and pastor of the Woodland Hills Church, Gregory Boyd. See Strobel at p. 112. While the entire interview is full of logical fallacies, my favorite occurred during Strobel and Boyd's discussion of the non-canonical Cross Gospel. When queried as to the credibility of the Cross Gospel, Boyd responded:
"No, most scholars don't give it credibility, because it includes such outlandishly legendary material. For instance, Jesus comes out of his tomb and he's huge - he goes up beyond the sky - and the cross comes out of the tomb and actually talks! Obviously, the much more sober gospels are more reliable than anything found in this account."
Strobel at p. 123.
Strobel never questions this assessment. He moves on to another gospel, presumably satisfied with a theory that distinguishes the genuine accounts of Jesus Christ from the frauds on the basis of the "outlandishly legendary" nature of the material. Strobel is comfortable with the idea that a giant Jesus and a talking cross are too obviously mythical to be believed. However, he completely ignores the necessary consequence of such a test: the canonical gospels, along with pretty much the entire Old Testament, Acts and most of the New Testament epistles, must fail this same test of legitimacy. Talking crosses are too outlandish to be believed? You'll get no argument from me, but don't try to sell me on the idea of having a conversation with inflamed shrubbery. A giant Jesus is absurd? Fair enough. But, so also is a giant Philistine, or a Jesus who walks on water, or a Jesus who flies into Heaven.
Boyd's major basis for distinguishing between one set of gospels and all of the rest is simply laughable, and yet Yale Law School partial-graduate Lee Strobel (did I mention that he has years of experience as a legal reporter and is Ivy League-educated?) failed to pick up on such an obvious flaw.
While the scene above is clearly one example of an error of logic in TCFC, it is important to note that it is representative of an epidemic of fallacy in Strobel's work. Throughout the book, Strobel employs specious reasoning and demonstrates an inability to recognized or challenge obvious flaws in the rationale of his supposed experts. Strobel introduces each of his chosen experts with an embarrassing appeal to authority; their education, publications, and even their stereotypically intelligent appearance are described in excrutiating detail as if such superficial nonsense will lend credence to the snippets of opinion that follow. Each interview is a series of softball questions followed by hollow answers lacking detail followed by either a softball follow-up or a gullible affirmation by the author. The expert "testimony" is generally lacking in substance and very, very few citations are made. We are supposed to believe the expert's typically summary conclusions for no other reason besides their impressive resumes and nerdy personas.
I will continue to read the book, if only because it is an incredibly easy read and a fertile source of ammunition with which to critique fundamentalist "logic."
